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A decision maker (DM) wishes to select a competent candidate to ￿ll a position.
However, since the wage and task of the position is predetermined, the DM cannot use
contract as a screening device. This paper formulates the problem as a class of selection
problem and derives the optimal selection procedure. The key element of our selection
procedure is voluntary testing. That is, unlike statistical selection procedures, the
signal generating process is endogenous. Then, the optimal selection rule takes into
account not only the test performances but also signaling element of the test. We
analyze the selection procedure as a signaling game and derive the optimal selection
rule. Moreover, the optimal size of candidate pool and the selection e¢ ciency are also
analyzed. It is shown that, by making the test voluntary, the selection e¢ ciency can
be dramatically improved.
Keywords. Signaling, Screening, Selection problem, Selection procedure, Testing
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0131 Introduction
Consider a situation in which a decision maker (DM) wishes to select a quali￿ed candidate
to ￿ll a position. For example, a ￿rm wishes to select a worker who has a su¢ cient ability
to perform certain task. A university wishes to fund students whose academic ability is
higher than certain level. The standard approach for such problem is screening, that is,
the DM designs a contract which satis￿es incentive compatible condition in order to sort
out quali￿ed candidates. However, it is often the case that there is little room to design
contract. For example, in many public positions, the task and wage are predetermined. In
fellowship/scholarship positions, there is often no task and the amount of the scholarship is
already ￿xed. The purpose of this paper is to propose a simple selection procedure for such
environments.
We formulate the problem as a class of selection problem in mathematical statistics
literature, e.g., Lehmann (1961). Selection problem is to select a population which posses
certain unobservable characteristics from a grand population. In other words, the purpose
of selection is to ￿nd "quali￿ed" candidates. Then, selection procedure is de￿ned to be a
selection rule which maximizes the objective of the DM given available information. This
paper extends the standard selection procedure to a strategic environment. In the standard
selection procedure, all available information about candidates is exogenously given. On the
other hand, in our selection procedure, since each candidate chooses whether to take a test,
the signal generating process is endogenous. Then, since the action of candidates can reveal
private information, the DM can utilize information not only from test performances but
also from their actions.
We analyze the selection procedure as a signaling game between candidates and the DM.
Given private information, each candidate decides whether to take the test. Then, the DM
selects one candidate after observing the test results. The test technology is assumed to be
monotonic, that is, higher type tends to perform better. Then, the optimal selection rule
is the DM￿ s equilibrium strategy. We focus on "testing equilibrium," which is symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium where some types take the test with strictly positive probability.
In Section 3, it is shown that there exists unique testing equilibrium if the cost of select-
ing unquali￿ed types, i.e., "false positive," is su¢ ciently high for the DM. More intuitively,
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ability, there exists a unique testing equilibrium. In the testing equilibrium, each candidate
takes the test only if his type is higher than a cuto⁄ type. Hence, whenever one candidate
takes the test in equilibrium, his type is higher than the cuto⁄ type. Then, based on the
equilibrium posterior belief, the optimal selection rule is derived. We show that the optimal
selection rule is based on both relative and absolute evaluation of the test performances.
In our selection procedure, the size of candidate pool a⁄ects the level of information
revelation in the testing equilibrium and determines the selection e¢ ciency. Hence, the DM
may wish to choose not only the selection rule but also the size of candidate pool. For
instance, the DM can increase the size of candidate pool by notifying the opportunity to
larger population. If the size of candidate pool is too large, the DM can reduce the size by a
fair lottery. Section 4 de￿nes optimal candidate pool to be the size of candidate pool which
maximizes the DM￿ s interest. First, we analyze the case where the DM cannot control the
cost of test for candidates. Then, we provide the upper and lower bounds of the optimal size.
Second, we analyze the case in which the DM can control the cost of test for candidates. In
this case, we can easily pin down the optimal size. It is shown that the optimal size only
depends on the DM￿ s cost of testing and the distribution of types.
In Section 5, we de￿ne selection power to be the probability of "true positives," i.e., the
selected candidate is one of quali￿ed types. Then, given a selection power, we analyze the
minimum size of candidate pool which attains the selection power. It is shown that, whenever
the DM￿ s cost of "false positives" is su¢ ciently high, our selection procedure can attain any
level of selection power with a ￿nite number of candidates. Moreover, we compare our
selection procedure with a purely statistical selection procedure, i.e., the signal generating
process is exogenous. It is shown that the minimum size of candidate pool to attain the
certain selection power is always smaller in our selection procedure. Moreover, we show
that, whenever the DM￿ s cost of "false positive" is su¢ ciently high, the selection procedure
with exogenous signals has no selection power. On the other hand, with the same cost of
"false positive," our procedure can attain any level of selection power as long as the size of
candidate pool is su¢ ciently large.
Related literature. The formulation of selection problem is based on Lehmann (1961). His
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 013paper provides the optimum properties of selection procedure for non-strategic environment,
e.g., selection of products, plants etc. Our paper is an extension of the selection procedure
to a strategic environment.
Testing is already incorporated to some earlier screening models, e.g., Guasch and Weiss
(1980) and Nalebu⁄ and Scharfstein (1987). However, in their models, quali￿ed candidates
can be sorted out by the wage schedule which depends on the test result. Hence, the spirit of
their models is di⁄erent from that of ours. Unlike their models and other screening models,
our paper focuses on the environment in which there is little room to design contract, i.e.,
predetermined wage and task. Hence, the contribution of our paper is to provide a simple
selection procedure for such non-standard screening environment. La⁄ont and Martimort
(2002) discuss the importance of incentive design for economic environments where the set
of feasible contracts is limited.
We analyze the selection procedure as a signaling game in which the DM observes not
only action but also the test result. Since the payo⁄ function is the same across all types in
our signaling game, the standard single crossing condition is violated. However, since the test
performance statistically re￿ ects private information and the candidate has to outperform
other candidates to be selected, the test becomes e⁄ective signaling device as competition
among candidates becomes stronger. That is, when the number of candidates is su¢ ciently
large, each candidate takes the test only if his type is higher than a certain level. On the
other hand, when the number of candidates is small, the test is not e⁄ective signaling device
and all equilibria can be pooling.
Finally, in our model, since candidates compete to get an opportunity, there is some
similarity to contest models, e.g., Siegel (2009). There are some contest models which study
the selection e¢ ciency of contest, e.g., Hvide and Kristiansen (2003). However, the spirit of
our model is di⁄erent from contest models. In contest models, the main interest is in the
e⁄ort level of contestants given a ￿xed "selection rule," i.e., contest. On the other hand, in
our model, the main interest is in the optimal selection rule to sort out quali￿ed types. That
is, the selection rule is chosen by the DM to select ￿quali￿ed￿candidates. Moreover, since
the selection rule is not designed to induce higher e⁄ort, our paper is also di⁄erent from
optimal contest literatures.
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First, we de￿ne selection problem based on Lehmann (1961). Let I = f1;2;::;Ig be a set of
candidates and ￿ = [￿min;￿max] be a set of types. Given ￿
￿ 2 int(￿); the set of quali￿ed
types is de￿ned to be f￿ 2 ￿j￿ ￿ ￿
￿g. For each candidate, the type is private information
and independently drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution G(￿) with
supp(g) = ￿: Then, a selection problem is hI;￿;￿
￿;K;gi in which a decision maker
(DM) selects at most K candidates so that the selected candidates are quali￿ed types. For
simplicity, we focus on the case K = 1:1
The payo⁄ function of the DM is as follows. If the DM selects candidate i and ￿i ￿ ￿
￿;
then the DM￿ s payo⁄ is 1. On the other hand, if the DM selects candidate i and ￿i < ￿
￿,
then the DM￿ s payo⁄ is ￿￿ where ￿ > 0 is the cost of "false positives." For example, if
unquali￿ed types can produce nothing, ￿ may be the wage the ￿rm pays. If unquali￿ed
types can damage the ￿rm, ￿ may be the damage and the wage. Finally, the DM￿ s payo⁄ is
0 if he rejects all candidates: All candidates wish to be selected and the position has common
value w > 0 which can be interpreted as wage for job candidates and scholarship for students.
The DM applies a selection procedure hX;Z;f;ri which consists of two stages. The
￿rst stage is a signal generating process. Concretely, each candidate decides whether to
take a test. If candidate i takes the test, the performance xi 2 X = [x; ￿ x] is drawn from
probability distribution F(:j￿i): Then, let Z = X [ f?g be the set of signals that each
candidate can generate and zi 2 Z denote the signal of candidate i: Concretely, if candidate
i takes the test, zi = xi and, if candidate i does not take the test, zi = ?: The second stage
is a selection process. Given available information (z1;z2;::;zI) 2 ZI; the DM selects one
candidate or rejects all based on a selection rule r(z1;z2;::;zI) where r : ZI ! I [f?g:
We assume that the test technology f satis￿es the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. supp(f(:j￿)) = X for any ￿.
Assumption 2.
f(:j￿0)
f(:j￿) is strictly increasing in x if ￿
0 > ￿:
Assumption 1 says that, there is no test performance which perfectly reveals the type.
1For K > 1; most of results are qualitatively preserved .
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property.
The test costs c 2 (0;w) for any candidate. When a candidate does not take the test, his
payo⁄ is w if he is selected and 0 if he is not selected. When a candidate takes the test, his
payo⁄ is w ￿ c if he is selected and ￿c if he is not selected. Note that the payo⁄ function is
the same across types.
It is assumed that each candidate takes his action to maximize his expected payo⁄ and
the DM selects a candidate to maximize his expected payo⁄. Then, we analyze the selection
procedure as a signaling game in which candidates are the senders and the DM is the receiver.
Let Ai = f0;1g be candidate i￿ s set of actions where 0 denotes "not taking the test" and 1
denotes "taking the test." Then, candidate i￿ s strategy is a mapping si : ￿ ! Ai: On the
other hand, the DM￿ s strategy is selection rule r(z1;z2;::;zI): We de￿ne testing equilibrium
to be perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which (i) the strategy pro￿le of candidates is symmetric,
i.e., si(￿i) = sj(￿j) if ￿i = ￿j (ii) the probability that some candidates take the test is strictly
positive, i.e.,
R
f￿js(￿)=1g g(￿)d￿ > 0: Then, this paper focuses on testing equilibrium.
The rest of this paper investigates the followings: (i) the selection rule which maximizes
the DM￿ s interest (ii) the size of candidate pool which maximizes the DM￿ s interest (iii) the
selection e¢ ciency of the procedure.
3 Optimal selection rule
Since we analyze the selection procedure as a signaling game, the optimal selection rule is
the DM￿ s equilibrium strategy. This section analyzes testing equilibrium and characterizes
the optimal selection rule given size of candidate pool I:
The following lemma provides the properties of the DM￿ s optimal reaction given candi-
dates￿strategy pro￿le s.
Lemma 1. Given candidates￿strategy pro￿le s, there exists x(s) 2 X such that
(i) if r(z1;z2;::;zI) = i and ai = 1; then xi ￿ xj for any j and xi ￿ x(s):
(ii) if r(z1;z2;::;zI) = ? and aj = 1; then xj < x(s):
5
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Thus, whenever candidate i is selected, two conditions have to be satis￿ed. First, the















for all j: Then, by the MLR property, xi ￿ xj: This proves the ￿rst part of (i).







Observe that, by the MLR property,
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i is increasing in xi and
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i
is decreasing in xi: Then, let
x(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
e x if there exists
R





￿i￿￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i > ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i for all xi
￿ x if
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i < ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿s(￿ijxi)d￿i for all xi
:
Hence, the expected payo⁄ from selecting candidate i is positive if and only if xi ￿ x(s).
Q.E.D.
Remark. If K > 1; whenever a candidate is selected, his performance is at least as good
as K-th highest performance. On the other hand, x(s) is the same as that of K = 1:
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1 if ￿i > ^ ￿
0 if ￿i < ^ ￿
The next lemma claims that, in any testing equilibria, all candidates play a cuto⁄strategy.
Lemma 2. Any testing equilibrium consists of a cuto⁄ strategy pro￿le.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists ￿
0 > ￿
00 such that si(￿
0) = 0 and si(￿
00) = 1: Then,





F(xij￿j) if ￿j 2 ￿(s)
1 if ￿j = 2 ￿(s)
:
Then, since the distribution of types is independent, the probability that candidate i￿ s
performance xi is the highest among all candidates is






Hence, by Lemma 1, the expected payo⁄ of type ￿ from the test given s and I is
Z
xi￿x(s)
wPr(xi ￿ xj;8jjs;I)dF(xij￿i) ￿ c:












0 has incentive to deviate, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
The next proposition states that whenever the cost of "false positive" is su¢ ciently high
for the DM, there exists a unique testing equilibrium for any I: On the other hand, even if
the cost of "false positive" is low, whenever the number of candidates is su¢ ciently large,
there exists a testing equilibrium.
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(i) If (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) > 1, there exists a unique testing equilibrium for any I:
(ii) If (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) ￿ 1, testing equilibrium exists for su¢ ciently large I





F(xij￿j) if ￿j > ^ ￿
1 if ￿j < ^ ￿
Then, given ^ ￿-cuto⁄ strategy, the probability that candidate i￿ s performance xi is the
highest among all candidates is






Moreover, let U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) be the expected payo⁄from the test for candidate i with ￿i = ^ ￿
given ^ ￿-cuto⁄ strategy pro￿le, c and I. That is,
U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) =
Z
xi￿x(^ ￿)
wPr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I)dF(xij^ ￿) ￿ c
Then the proof consists of three claims.
Claim 1. U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is continuous and strictly increasing in ^ ￿:
First, it is easy to see that Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I) is continuous and strictly increasing in ^ ￿:
Second, by abusing notation, let
x(^ ￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
e x if there exists
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ije x)d￿i = ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ije x)d￿i
x if
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ijxi)d￿i > ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ijxi)d￿i for all xi
￿ x if
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ijxi)d￿i < ￿
R
















i if zi = ?
Then, obviously,
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ijx)d￿i and
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ijx)d￿i are both continuous in ^ ￿: More-
over, by the MLR property,
R




Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 013is strictly decreasing in ^ ￿: Hence, x(^ ￿) is decreasing in ^ ￿: Therefore, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is continuous
and strictly increasing in ^ ￿:
Claim 2. There exits a unique cuto⁄ equilibrium if (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) > 1.
Note that, as ^ ￿ ! ￿max; the probability that some candidate takes the test goes to 0.
Hence, by choosing ^ ￿ close to ￿max; we can make Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I) arbitrarily close to 1.
Then, lim^ ￿!￿max U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = w ￿ c > 0:
To construct the cuto⁄equilibrium, ￿rst, suppose lim^ ￿!￿min U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) ￿ 0: Then, by the
MLR property, lim^ ￿!￿min U(￿j^ ￿;I;c) ￿ 0 for any ￿ and, by Claim 1, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) ￿ 0 for any
^ ￿: Thus, the equilibrium cuto⁄is ￿min; that is, the equilibrium strategy is such that si(￿) = 1
for all ￿: Second, consider the case where lim^ ￿!￿min U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) < 0; then, by Claim 1, there
exists a unique ^ ￿ 2 int(￿) such that U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = 0 and this is the equilibrium cuto⁄ type.
Claim 3. Suppose (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) < 1: There exits a cuto⁄ equilibrium if I is su¢ ciently
large.
Note that, whenever no one takes the test, all candidates who do not take the test are
indi⁄erent for the DM. Moreover, if (1+￿)G(￿
￿) < 1; the DM￿ s expected payo⁄from choos-
ing any candidate is strictly larger than 0. Then, suppose the DM selects each candidate
with the same probability, 1
I; when no one takes the test. Observe that, given a cuto⁄strat-
egy with ^ ￿ ￿ ￿




￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i > ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i: On the other hand, the expected payo⁄ is 0 if
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i < ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i: Note that
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i > ￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i
for large ^ ￿ since (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) < 1: Moreover, it is easy to see that the expected pay-
o⁄ from "not taking test" is increasing in ^ ￿: Then, since w
I G(^ ￿)I￿1 is increasing in ^ ￿ and
lim^ ￿!￿max
w
I G(^ ￿)I￿1 = w
I ; we have lim^ ￿!￿maxfU(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) ￿ w
I G(^ ￿)I￿1g > 0 for I > w
w￿c:
Now, choose a large I so that lim^ ￿!￿￿ U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) < 0: Then, since U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c)￿w
I G(^ ￿)I￿1 <
0 for small ^ ￿ > ￿
￿; there exists ^ ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿max) such that U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = w
I G(^ ￿)I￿1: If
R
￿i￿￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i >
￿
R
￿i<￿￿ ￿^ ￿(￿ij?)d￿i for such ^ ￿; then let such ^ ￿ be the equilibrium cuto⁄type. Otherwise, let
the solution of U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = 0 be the equilibrium cuto⁄ type. Q.E.D.
To get an intuition of condition (1+￿)G(￿
￿) > 1; suppose that the DM has to make his
decision only based on the prior probability. Then, the DM strictly prefers "rejecting all"
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￿) > 1: Hence, there exists a unique testing
equilibrium whenever the DM prefers not to select any candidate without information. If
(1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) < 1, the existence of testing equilibrium is not guaranteed for small I. For
example, there is no testing equilibrium if (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) < 1 and I = 1:
As we mentioned before, the optimal selection rule is the DM￿ s equilibrium strategy. To






i if xi ￿ xj for any j and xi ￿ x(^ ￿(c;I))
? if, for any j 2 I; xj < x(^ ￿(c;I))
:
where ^ ￿(c;I) is the equilibrium cuto⁄ type in the testing equilibrium given c and I:
Note that the selection rule is based on both absolute and relative performances. More-
over, the minimum performance criterion x(^ ￿(c;I)) depends on the cost of test c and the
size of candidate pool I: Then, the next section analyzes the optimal size I for the optimal
selection rule.
4 Optimal candidate pool
In the last section, we derived the optimal selection rule given I and c: This section focuses on
the case in which there exists a unique testing equilibrium, i.e. (1+￿)G(￿
￿) > 1; and analyzes
the optimal size of candidate pool. We assume that testing is costly for the DM. Concretely,
suppose that the testing costs ￿ > 0 per candidate for the DM. Then, let W(I;￿) denote
the ex ante expected payo⁄ of the DM in which candidates play the testing equilibrium.
Then, optimal candidate pool I￿ is de￿ned to be the size of candidate pool such that
W(I￿;￿) ￿ W(I;￿) for any I:
The optimal size of candidate pool is analyzed in two cases. First, we analyze the case
in which cost c is ￿xed, e.g., c is the cost of a standard test. Second, we analyze the case in
which the DM can control both I and c.
4.1 Optimal candidate pool given c
Suppose that the DM chooses I to maximize his expected payo⁄ given c: The next lemma
clari￿es the relationship between the equilibrium cuto⁄ type and the size of candidate pool.
Let ^ ￿(c;I) be the equilibrium cuto⁄ given c and I:
10
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is strictly increasing in I > I0:
Proof. Given a cuto⁄ strategy pro￿le, Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I) > Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I + 1):
Hence, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) > U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I + 1;c): Note that, from Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition
1, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is strictly increasing in ^ ￿: Then, if there exists a solution of U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = 0;
the solution of U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I + 1;c) = 0 is strictly higher. Hence, if ^ ￿(c;I) 2 int(￿); then,
^ ￿(c;I) < ^ ￿(c;I + 1). On the other hand, if ^ ￿(c;I) = ￿min; then, ^ ￿(c;I) ￿ ^ ￿(c;I + 1):
For the second part, observe that lim^ ￿!￿min U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) < 0 if I is su¢ ciently large,
then ^ ￿(c;I) 2 int(￿) for such I: Thus, if I0 is de￿ned to be the smallest I such that
lim^ ￿!￿min U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) < 0; ^ ￿(c;I) is strictly increasing in I > I0: Q.E.D.
Remark. Any I < 1; ^ ￿(c;I) < ￿max:
Lemma 3 says that if there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all types take the test
for small I; then, there exists I from which the testing equilibrium is semi-pooling for larger
I.
The next lemma shows that larger candidate pool always increases the probability of
"successful selection" as long as the size of candidate pool is smaller than a certain level.
Let
^ I(c) = maxfIj￿(c;I) < ￿
￿g:
Moreover, let ￿+(I;^ ￿) be the probability that the DM selects a candidate with ￿ ￿ ￿
￿given
I and ^ ￿:
Lemma 4. ￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) < ￿+(I + 1;^ ￿(c;I + 1)) for I ￿ ^ I(c) and ￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) =
1 ￿ G(^ ￿(c;I))I for I > ^ I(c):
Proof. To prove the ￿rst part, note the probability that the DM selects candidate i and






Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I)f(xij￿i)dG(￿i)dxi:
Then, by symmetry, ￿+(I;^ ￿) =
P
i qi(I;^ ￿) = Iqi(I;^ ￿):
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￿i￿maxf^ ￿;￿￿g Pr(xi = x ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I)f(xij￿i)dG(￿i) x ￿ x(^ ￿)
0 if x < x(^ ￿)
:


















￿+(I + 1;^ ￿;x)




























￿+(I + 1;^ ￿;x)
￿+(I + 1;^ ￿;x0)
:
and the inequality is strict for x0 > x(^ ￿)
Hence, Z
xi￿x(^ ￿)




Claim 2. ￿+(I;^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ given I:
For ^ ￿ < ￿
￿; ^ ￿ a⁄ects ￿+(I;^ ￿) through two channels, i.e., Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I) and x(^ ￿):
First, observe that since the number of competitors becomes smaller, Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I) is
increasing in ^ ￿: Second, as we see in Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, x(^ ￿) is decreasing
in ^ ￿. Hence, ￿+(I;^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿ < ￿
￿:
Claim 3. ￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) < ￿+(I + 1;^ ￿(c;I + 1)) for I ￿ ^ I(c):
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￿ for all I ￿
^ I(c): Then, by Claim 2, ￿+(I + 1;^ ￿(c;I)) < ￿+(I + 1;^ ￿(c;I + 1)) for I ￿ ^ I(c): Hence,
￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) < ￿+(I + 1;^ ￿(c;I + 1)) for I ￿ ^ I(c):
For the second part, note that if I > ^ I(c); then ￿
￿ ￿ ^ ￿(c;I) and thus x(^ ￿) = x: Hence,
whenever the DM fails to select a quali￿ed candidate, this is only because no one takes the
test. Then, the probability of such event is G(^ ￿(c;I))I: Q.E.D.
To get an intuition of Lemma 4, note that, if I ￿ ^ I; not only quali￿ed types but also
unquali￿ed types take the test. Then, when the number of candidates becomes larger, the
chance that a quali￿ed candidate outperforms other candidates becomes higher. Moreover,
as we showed in Lemma 3, when the number of candidates is larger, the set of unquali￿ed
types who take the test becomes smaller in equilibrium. Hence, more competition increases
the probability of "successful selection." When I > ^ I(c); candidates who take the test are
all quali￿ed types in equilibrium. Hence, as long as some candidates take the test, the DM
can select a quali￿ed type. On the other hand, if I > ^ I(c); quali￿ed types in [￿
￿;^ ￿(c;I)) do
not take the test in equilibrium. Hence, if all quali￿ed types in the candidate pool are in
[￿
￿;^ ￿(c;I)); no one takes the test and the DM cannot select any quali￿ed candidate.
The next lemma claims that, whenever the size of candidate pool is su¢ ciently large, the
probability of selecting a unquali￿ed candidate is zero. Let ￿￿(I;^ ￿) be the probability that
the DM selects a candidate whose type is ￿ < ￿
￿:
Lemma 5. ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) > 0 for I ￿ ^ I(c) and ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) = 0 if I > ^ I(c):
Proof. Observe that, by the similar reasoning as ￿+(I;^ ￿);





Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I)f(xij￿i)dG(￿i)dxi
First, if I ￿ ^ I(c) , then ^ ￿(c;I) < ￿
￿: Thus, ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) > 0: Second, if I > ^ I(c); then
minf^ ￿;￿
￿g = ￿
￿ and thus ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) = 0 for any I: Q.E.D.
The idea of Lemma 5 is as follows. When I > ^ I(c); only quali￿ed types take the test in
the testing equilibrium. Note that, since (1+￿)G(￿
￿) > 1; the DM selects a candidate only
if he takes the test. Then, no candidate whose type is ￿ < ￿
￿ can be selected.
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observe that the minimum level of performance for the selection x(^ ￿(c;I)) is decreasing in
I: Thus, the probability that unquali￿ed types can satisfy the minimum performance level
becomes higher. Then, even though the probability that unquali￿ed types take the test is
smaller for larger I ￿ ^ I(c), the net e⁄ect on ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) is not obvious.
Before the main result of this section, we need to establish the following lemma. Let
￿(I;￿;c) = 1 ￿ G(^ ￿(c;I))I ￿ ￿I:
Lemma 6. If there exists I > ^ I(c) such that G(^ ￿(c;I))I ￿ G(^ ￿(c;I + 1))I+1 > ￿; then
there exists e I(￿) < 1 such that e I(￿) > ^ I(c) and ￿(e I(￿);￿;c) ￿ ￿(I0;￿;c) for any I0 > ^ I(c).
Proof. Note that ￿(I +1;￿;c)￿￿(I;￿;c) = G(^ ￿(c;I))I ￿G(^ ￿(c;I +1))I+1￿￿ if I > ^ I(c):
Then, by Lemma 3, G(^ ￿(c;I))I ￿ G(^ ￿(c;I + 1))I+1 < G(^ ￿(c;I))I(1 ￿ G(^ ￿(c;I)). Note that,
since limI!1 G(^ ￿(c;I)) = 1; G(^ ￿(c;I))I ￿G(^ ￿(c;I +1))I+1 < ￿ for su¢ ciently large I: Then,
given ￿; there exists maxI>^ I(c) ￿(I;￿;c) and, then, let e I(￿;c) = argmaxI>^ I(c) ￿(I;￿;c): Q.E.D.
The next proposition provides the properties of the optimal candidate pool.
Proposition 2. Let I￿ be the optimal size of candidate pool.
(i) I￿ ￿ e I(￿;c):
(ii) For su¢ ciently small ￿; I￿ = ^ I(c) or e I(￿;c):
(iii) For su¢ ciently small ￿ and su¢ ciently large ￿; I￿ = e I(￿;c):
Proof. Note that
W(I;￿) = ￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) ￿ ￿￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) ￿ ￿I:
(i) To see the upper bound of I￿; recall that, by Lemma 4, ￿+(I;^ ￿(c;I)) = 1￿G(^ ￿(c;I))I
for any I > ^ I(c): Moreover, by Lemma 5, ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) = 0 whenever I > ^ I(c) . Hence,
W(I;￿) = 1 ￿ G(^ ￿)I ￿ ￿I for I > ^ I(c): Then, by Lemma 6, I￿ = e I(￿;c) whenever I￿ > ^ I(c):
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immediately follows. Let ^ W(^ ￿;I) be the expected payo⁄ of the DM in which candidates￿
strategy pro￿le is ^ ￿-cuto⁄ and the number of candidates is I:
Claim 1. Given I < ^ I(c); ^ W(^ ￿;I) is increasing in ^ ￿ < ￿
￿:
Let y be the highest performance among candidates. First, consider ^ ￿
0
;^ ￿ such that
￿
￿ > ^ ￿
0















for any y ￿ x(^ ￿
0
): Moreover, the inequality is strict if x(^ ￿
0
) ￿ y < x(^ ￿): Hence, ^ W(^ ￿
0
;I) ￿
^ W(^ ￿;I). Finally, if y < x(^ ￿
0
); then the DM￿ s payo⁄ is 0 for both ^ ￿
0
and ^ ￿: Hence, W(^ ￿;I) is
increasing in ^ ￿ < ￿
￿ given I:
Claim 2. Given ^ ￿ < ￿
￿;W(^ ￿;I) is increasing in I:
Again, let y be the highest performance among candidates. Then, by the MLR property,
the expected payo⁄ of the DM is increasing in y:
Now, consider the distribution of y given I. To see how additional candidate a⁄ects the
distribution of y; suppose we add a candidate j0 to a candidate pool with size I: Then, given
the probability of having y conditional on I; p(yjI); we can write the probability of having
y conditional on I + 1; p(yjI + 1); as follows.










F(yj￿j) if ￿j0 > ^ ￿






















Thus, p(yjI + 1) ￿rst-order-stochastically dominates p(yjI): Then, since the expected
payo⁄ of the DM is increasing in y; the expected payo⁄ is higher in I + 1:
Therefore, from Claim 1 and Claim 2, W(I;￿) is increasing in I < ^ I(c):
(iii) By Lemma 5, ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) = 0 if I > ^ I(c) and ￿￿(I;^ ￿(c;I)) > 0 if I ￿ ^ I(c):
Hence, if ￿ is su¢ ciently large and ￿ is small, any I ￿ ^ I(c) cannot be optimal. Then, by (i),
I￿ = e I(￿): Q.E.D.
4.2 Optimal candidate pool with controllable cost
Now, suppose the DM can choose both I and c to maximize his interest.
Lemma 7. ^ ￿(c;I) is increasing and continuous in c: Moreover, there exists c0 such that
^ ￿(c;I) is strictly increasing in c > c0:
Proof. From Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 1, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is strictly increasing in
^ ￿: Moreover, obviously, U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is strictly decreasing in c: Thus, if there exists ^ ￿ which
solves U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) = 0; ^ ￿ which solves U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c + ") = 0 for " > 0 is strictly higher. Hence,
if ^ ￿(c;I) 2 int(￿); then, ^ ￿(c;I) < ^ ￿(c + ";I). On the other hand, if ^ ￿(c;I) = ￿min; then,
^ ￿(c;I) ￿ ^ ￿(c + ";I): Moreover, since U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) is strictly increasing and continuous in ^ ￿;
^ ￿(c;I) is continuous in c:
For the second part, observe that lim^ ￿!￿min U(^ ￿j^ ￿;I;c) < 0 if c is su¢ ciently large,
then ^ ￿(c;I) 2 int(￿) for such I: Thus, if c0 is de￿ned to be the smallest c such that
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Lemma 8. Given I and the optimal selection rule r￿; c￿(I) maximizes the DM￿ s expected
payo⁄.
Proof. Observe that ^ ￿(c￿(I);I) = ￿
￿: First, if c < c￿(I); then, from Lemma 7, the
probability that the DM selects a candidate with ￿ < ￿
￿ is strictly positive. Second, if
c > c￿(I); then, ￿
￿ < ^ ￿(c;I) from Lemma 7. Thus, when all quali￿ed candidates are in
[￿
￿;^ ￿(c;I)]; the DM fails to select any quali￿ed candidates. If c = c￿(I); the probability that
the DM selects a candidate with ￿ < ￿
￿ is 0. Moreover, whenever there are some quali￿ed
candidates in the candidate pool, the probability that the DM selects one of them is 1.
Q.E.D.
Remark. Since the expected payo⁄ of the cuto⁄ type is decreasing in I; c￿(I) is also
decreasing in I:
Now, we are ready to derive the optimal size of candidate pool. The next proposition
shows that, when c is controllable, we can easily pin down the optimal size. Let





Proposition 3. I￿ = ￿ I(￿):
Proof. By Lemma 8, the DM chooses c￿(I) given I: Then, for any I; the DM fails to
select any quali￿ed candidate only if there is no candidate in the candidate pool. Since the
probability of such event is G(￿
￿)I; the expected payo⁄of the DM from c￿(I) is 1￿G(￿
￿)I￿￿I:
Thus, the optimal size of candidate pool is ￿ I(￿): Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 says that whenever the DM can control both c and I; the optimal size of
candidate pool only depends on G(￿
￿) and ￿: To see why the optimal size does not depend
on other factors such as test technology f and payo⁄parameter w; recall that, when the DM
maximizes his expected payo⁄, he chooses c = c￿(I￿). Then, c￿(I￿) re￿ ects f and w:
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This section analyzes the relationship between the size of candidate pool and "selection
power" of the procedure given cost c and test technology f: We de￿ne selection power to
be the probability that the selected candidate is ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ given I; that is, Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I):





minfIj1 ￿ " < Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I)g if fIj1 ￿ " < Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I)g 6= ;
? if fIj1 ￿ " < Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I)g = ;
:
The following proposition provides the properties of I("):
Proposition 4. Suppose (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) > 1: For any " > 0; I (") ￿ ^ I(c) + 1: Moreover,
I(") = ^ I(c) + 1 for su¢ ciently small " > 0:
Proof. Observe that, if I > ^ I(c); all candidates who take the test are ￿ ￿ ￿
￿: Hence,
whenever the DM selects a candidate, he is ￿ ￿ ￿
￿: That is, Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I)g = 1
for any I > ^ I(c): Therefore, for any " > 0; I(") ￿ ^ I(c) + 1. On the other hand, note
that, for any I ￿ ^ I(c); the probability that the DM selects ￿ 2 [^ ￿(c;I);￿
￿) is positive.
Hence, Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I) < 1 for any I ￿ ^ I(c): Thus, for su¢ ciently small " > 0;
Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿jr 6= ?;I)g < 1 ￿ " for all I ￿ ^ I(c): Therefore, I(") = ^ I(c) + 1 for su¢ ciently
small " > 0: Q.E.D.
In the rest of this section, we compare our selection procedure with a purely statistical
selection procedure in terms of I("): A selection procedure is passive selection procedure
if it is mandatory for candidates to take the test. More preciously, in the passive selection
procedure, zi = xi for all i: Thus, the signal generating process is exogenous and there is no
signaling element in the selection procedure. Let IP(") be the minimum size of candidate
pool for the passive selection procedure to attain 1 ￿ ": To distinguish our procedure to the
passive procedure, let us call our procedure "strategic selection procedure."
Proposition 5. Suppose (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) > 1:
(i) IP(") ￿ I("):
(ii) There exists ^ " < 1 such that IP(^ ") = ? for any " < ^ ":
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Then, Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿ : ￿min;I) =
P
i qi(I;￿min) = Iqi(I;￿min):
Turning to the strategic selection procedure, suppose candidate i takes the test. Then,







Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I)f(xij￿i)dG(￿ij￿i ￿ ^ ￿)dxi:
Then, Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿ : ^ ￿;I) =
P
i qi(I;^ ￿) = Iqi(I;^ ￿):
First, it is easy to see that Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj￿min;I) ￿ Pr(xi ￿ xj;8jj^ ￿;I): Second,
x(￿min) ￿ x(^ ￿). Moreover, G(￿ij￿i ￿ ^ ￿) ￿rst-order-stochastically dominates G(￿i): Hence,
Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿ : ￿min;I) ￿ Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿ : ^ ￿;I). That is, whenever I0 = IP("); Pr(￿r ￿ ￿
￿ : ^ ￿;I0) <
1 ￿ ":
(ii) First, by the analogous argument to the proof in Lemma 4, we can show that Pr(￿r ￿
￿
￿ : ￿min;I) is increasing in I: Then, since the highest performance converges to ￿ x as I ! 1;












Let ^ " = 1 ￿ limI!1 Pr(￿r > ￿
￿ : ￿min;I): Then, for any " < ^ "; fIj1 ￿ " < Pr(￿r > ￿
￿ :
￿min;I)g = ;: Q.E.D.
An intuition of the result is the following. Since the passive selection procedure has no
signaling element, the selection power is restricted by the test technology f. On the other
hand, in the strategic selection procedure, since larger number of candidates can make the
signaling more informative, the DM can sort out quali￿ed types with higher probability given
the same test technology f.
Remark. Note that, if the test is very noisy and the distribution of types has a large
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passive selection procedure, i.e., IP(") = ? for any " < 1: On the other hand, the strategic
selection procedure can select a quali￿ed candidate with a high probability in the same
environment as long as the size of candidate pool is su¢ ciently large.
Remark. Whenever testing equilibrium does not exist, i.e., (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) < 1 and I
is small, the DM has to make a decision based on the prior probability. In this case, the
passive selection procedure, which utilizes test performances, can outperform the strategic
selection procedure. Hence, when ￿ is small, the DM may prefer the passive procedure to
the strategic procedure.
6 Summary
This section summarizes the main results.





i if xi ￿ xj for any j and xi ￿ x(^ ￿(c;I))
? if, for any j 2 I; xj < x(^ ￿(c;I))
where ^ ￿(c;I) is the equilibrium cuto⁄ type.
2. Suppose (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) > 1:
(a) If c is not controllable and ￿ is su¢ ciently small; I￿(￿) = ^ I(c) or e I(￿;c): Moreover,
if ￿ is large, then I￿(￿) = e I(￿;c):
(b) If c is controllable, I￿ = ￿ I(￿) and c￿ = c￿(￿ I(￿))
3. Suppose (1 + ￿)G(￿
￿) ￿ 1: If I and ￿ are su¢ ciently small, the DM can be better o⁄
by making the test "mandatory."
7 Concluding remarks
This paper extends selection problem to a strategic environment and analyzes the property
of the optimal selection procedure. The motivation of our paper is mainly rooted in the
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selection procedure is designed to sort out "competent" types. On the other hand, unlike
screening which requires a ￿ exible environment to design contract, the selection procedure
can be applied to environments where the set of feasible contracts is quite restricted, e.g.,
predetermined wage and task. In other words, the approach of our paper is to formulate a
￿milder￿problem and develop a simple procedure which can be applicable to wider range of
environments.
There is another advantage of selection procedures. In screening models, it is assumed
that the agent knows own "type." However, when the type is "ability," such assumption
can be too strong since people are often overcon￿dent about own ability. When the DM￿ s
interest is not in selecting a ￿con￿dent￿ candidate but selecting a ￿quali￿ed￿ candidate,
it is important to employ testing, which re￿ ects true ability, in the selection process. In
fact, many recruiting and admission processes in the real world are based on testing or past
performances.
One possible future direction of "strategic selection procedure" is to explore various
kinds of signal generating process. For example, the testing can be sequential rather than
simultaneous. That is, each candidate sequentially decides whether to take the test given
the history of other candidates￿test performances. In this way, the DM may save some cost
for testing. On the other hand, it is not obvious that the DM can extract more private
information from such sequential procedure.
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